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Most of the literature about electoral systems is based on Maurice Duverger's (1951) intuitions. Duverger claims that electoral systems have systematic effects (hence the wellknown "laws") on the structure of electoral competition. In particular, the plurality rule entails a two-party system whereas majority runoff leads to multiparty competition.
Duverger argues that this can be explained by the conjunction of two effects: a mechanical effect and a psychological effect.
The mechanical effect, which takes place after the vote, is the process by which a distribution of votes is transformed into a distribution of seats. This effect is purely mechanical because it results from the strict application of the provisions of the electoral law. The psychological effect, which takes place before the vote, stems from the anticipation by voters and political actors of the mechanical effect. Because actors know the distortion entailed by the transformation of votes into seats, they adapt their behaviour so as to make votes count (Cox 1997) . This is commonly viewed as strategic voting on the side of voters and strategic entry on the side of parties and candidates.
Duverger's focus was on parliamentary elections. In this note, we defend the view that his distinction between mechanical and psychological effects is useful in other contexts, and we propose an adaptation to candidate elections. In such a context, only one person is to be elected. So, rather than focusing of the number of seats won by the different parties, our analysis will focus on the types of candidate which are elected. In particular, we evaluate the performance of different voting rules in selecting the Condorcet winner candidate (CW) ii , and measure the strength of the mechanical and psychological effects of electoral systems using as a criterion their propensity to elect this type of candidate.
To assess these effects, we build on a series of laboratory experiments on candidate elections held under plurality and majority runoff rules. Most of the empirical tests that have been conducted so far about Duverger's hypotheses were done using cross country comparisons based on observational studies.
iii While these studies are very valuable, the comparison of the mechanical and psychological effects across voting rules is nevertheless difficult. Indeed, these studies suffer from the weakness that countries not only differ with respect to their electoral institutions, but also with respect to other features which are very likely to influence electoral outcomes, such as the distribution of voter preferences or past electoral records. We propose to complement these studies by resorting to laboratory experiments. Indeed, voter preferences, together with the voting rule, are precisely what can be controlled in the laboratory. Other authors have used experiments to study voting rules, but to the best of our knowledge, they have not explicitly tackled the issue of the comparison of mechanical and psychological effects across voting rules. iv In this note, we
propose an original analysis, sorting out the mechanical and psychological effects of voting rules using such data.
We build on a series of laboratory experiments having elections held under plurality and majority runoff rules, where the distribution of voter preferences over a fixed set of candidates is given and fixed. We compare the probability that a Condorcet winner is elected in runoff vs. plurality elections. The total effect of the runoff system versus the plurality system is the difference in the CW election probability when voters vote under runoff, compared to when they vote under plurality. We then propose to decompose this total effect into its mechanical and psychological components. Note that we focus exclusively on psychological effects on voters, as candidates' positions are fixed.
What are the theoretical expectations about the sign and the size of these effects?
Regarding the total effect, one of the major claims of supporters of runoff elections is that they make it easier for median CW candidates to win (Blais 1991) . So we expect the total effect of the runoff effect to be positive. Regarding the mechanical effect of the run-off electoral system, it is unambiguously favorable to the Condorcet Winner (compared to the plurality electoral system). Indeed, in the runoff system, the Condorcet winner is elected whenever he is ranked first or second on the first round (because the CW wins by definition in the pair-wise comparison defined by the run-off), whereas in the plurality system, wins only if he is ranked first. So taking the votes as constant, the mechanical effect is positive.
Let us now consider the psychological effect. It depends on how voters' behavior differs across the two voting rules, therefore its sign is a priori ambiguous. Yet, we believe that the intuition might rather suggest this effect to be positive: if one candidate is made more likely to win through the mechanical effect of the electoral system, one might at first sight expect that the voters' reaction to this system (the psychological effect) will be to make him even more likely to win. Our objective is to test these predictions, by offering a way to measure these effects in the lab.
The experimental protocol
We use data from the laboratory experiments (23 sessions) done by Blais et al. (2007) .
Groups of 21 subjects (63 subjects in six sessions) are recruited in Paris, Lille (France) and Montreal (Canada). The participants are informed from the beginning that one of the 8 elections will be randomly chosen as the "decisive" election, which determinates payments. They are also told that they will be paid 20 Euros (or Canadian dollars) minus the distance between the elected candidate's position and their own assigned position in that election. vii For instance, a voter whose assigned position is 11 will receive 10 Euros if candidate A wins in the decisive elections, 12 if E wins, 15 if B wins, 17 if D wins, and 19 if C wins. We thus generate single-peaked preference profiles on the 5 candidates set. We will refer to candidates A and E as "extreme", and candidates B and D as "moderates". Since this setting is onedimensional and voters are distributed uniformly along this axis, candidate C is located at the median voter's position, and hence is the Condorcet winner. 
Measuring mechanical and psychological effects in candidate elections
Total effect. In those 23 sessions, we ran a total of 23*4=92 elections under each voting rule. The extreme candidates were never elected. ix The CW candidate was elected in 49% of the plurality elections.
x He was either directly elected (on the first round) or present in the run-off in 58% of the 2R elections. xi There is thus a weak, 58-49=+9 percentage points, positive total effect of runoff (over plurality) with respect to the election of the CW candidate. However, the effect is not statistically different from 0. The total effect can be visualized on Graph 1, which displays, for each voting rule, the percentage of elections where the Condorcet winner is ranked first, second and third or below (for runoff elections, this refers to first rounds). On the left hand side of this graph, one can see that the CW is ranked first (and thus is the winner) in 49% of the plurality elections. On the right hand side of this graph, one can see that in the first rounds of runoff elections, the CW is ranked first 37% of the time, and second 21% of the time, which makes him a winner in 37+21=58% of those elections.
We now propose a way to decompose this total effect into its mechanical and psychological components. This decomposition will help understand why the null total effect obtains.
Mechanical effect. In Duverger's setting, the mechanical effect refers to the transformation of votes into seats. In our candidate elections, this translates into the transformation of votes, by the voting rule, into winning and losing candidates, keeping individual votes constant. The mechanical effect is thus defined as the difference between the probability that the CW candidate is elected applying the runoff rule on actual plurality votes, and the actual observed probability of the CW candidate's victory when applying the plurality rule on the same plurality votes.
What is the expected sign of this mechanical effect? As noted in the introduction, under plurality the CW is elected if he is ranked first according to the obtained scores. Under the runoff system, he is elected if he is one of the top two candidates on the first round (provided that no other candidate obtains an absolute majority, which never happened in the data). Indeed, whenever the CW makes it to the second round, by definition, a majority of the voters prefer him over his opponent, whoever this opponent may be. The mechanical effect is therefore always positive: the election of the CW is more frequent under runoff than under plurality, given the distribution of votes.
To quantify the mechanical effect, we examine the 92 plurality elections in our dataset. For each of those elections, we consider the scores obtained by the 5 candidates, and we apply the runoff system. In this counterfactual simulation, we find that the CW candidate would be elected in 71% of the cases if the runoff rule were applied to plurality votes. Keeping the plurality votes constant, moving from plurality to runoff increases by 71-49=22 percentage points the probability that the CW candidate is elected. These numbers can be visualized on Graph 1. On the left hand side of this graph, one can see that in plurality elections, the CW is ranked first 49% of the time, and second 22% of the times. The mechanical effect corresponds to the probability that the CW is ranked second in plurality elections, as indicated on the graph.
Psychological effect. Keeping Duverger's interpretation, the psychological effect stems from the fact that people vote differently under runoff than they would do under plurality. We define the psychological effect of runoff vs. plurality as the difference in electoral outcomes due to the fact that voters behave differently in runoff and plurality elections, keeping the mechanical effects of the (runoff) electoral system constant. The psychological effect is thus defined as the difference between the probability that the CW candidate is elected applying a runoff rule on actual runoff votes and the probability that he would be elected applying a runoff rule on actual plurality votes.
Note that the sign of the psychological effect is a priori ambiguous, since it depends on how voters vote under the two rules. What is observed in the data? We know that the CW candidate wins 58% of the runoff elections. We also know that the same CW candidate would win 71% of the time with the same runoff system but using the distribution of votes observed in plurality elections. As a consequence, the psychological effect is negative: the effect is 58-71=-13 percentage points, as can be seen on Graph 1. xiii This means that voters are less inclined to vote for the CW candidate in runoff than in plurality elections.
We see that the mechanical and psychological effects partially cancel each other out, yielding a weak non significant positive net impact. In runoff elections, the CW candidate benefits from the fact that he is certain to win if he makes it to the second round, but he is disadvantaged by the weaker support that he is able to garner in the first round (compared to plurality elections).
Why is the psychological effect negative?
As noticed earlier, the sign of the psychological effect is a priori ambiguous. We build on previous individual-level analyses of these experiments (see Van der Straeten et al. 2010 We have reported on a series of 23 experimental sessions in which participants were invited to vo ru We hope this note contributes to a better understanding of the effects of the runoff system in candidate elections. One of the major claims of supporters of runoff elections is that they make it easier for median CW candidates to win (Blais 1991 The usual expectation is that psychological effects amplify mechanical ones. This is the case when voters in plurality elections refrain from voting for weak parties that are bound to be disadvantaged by the electoral system. This study has uncovered an instance where the two effects contradict each other. This is a reminder that we should not take for granted where a majority of voters is split between two majority-preferred candidates, to examine the propensity of different voting rules to elect the minority-preferred candidate. Felsenthal et al. (1988) , Forsythe et al. (1993 and 1996) , under the plurality voting rule, study various public coordinating devices, such as pre-election polls or repeated elections. Rietz (2008) examine the effects of runoff elections in these split-majority electorates. Morton and Rietz (2008) , comparing runoff and plurality elections, show that the minority candidate is less likely to be elected under runoff than under plurality elections. Forsythe & al. (1996) study approval voting and the Borda rule as well. All the results that are reported in this paper collapse the experiments held in Canada and
France. The patterns are very similar in the two countries. They also merge sessions where the first series of elections is held under plurality and the second series under run-off systems (11 sessions), and those where the reverse order is used (12 sessions). The results turn out to be the same whether a given rule is utilized first or second.
x During the experiment, ties were broken randomly. In the analysis, for reasons of consistency (see below), in case of such a tie, we reason in terms of probabilities. Consider for example the following scores: A:0, B:7, C:7, D:6, E:1 in a plurality election. There is a tie between candidates B and C. We then compute that with probability ½, candidate B (or C) is elected.
xi
As in plurality elections, we take care of actual ties by reasoning in terms of probability (cf.
footnote X). Besides, to compute the effects of runoff, we assume that the CW candidate is elected whenever he is present in the runoff. This is indeed the case in more than 95% of the elections in our experiments. Consider for example the following scores: A:0, B:8, C:6, D:6, E:1 in the first round of a runoff election. There is a tie between candidates C and D to decide which candidate will go to the runoff. We then compute that with probability ½ the runoff is between B and C, in which case C is elected with probability 1, and with probability ½, the run-off is between B and D, in which case C is not elected. With such a distribution of votes, we say that C is therefore elected with probability ½.
We do this to have a consistent method when we perform counterfactual simulations.
xii Preliminary tests have shown that outcomes under plurality and outcomes under the runoff rule within the same session are not correlated. If one is to assume that observations within series of elections are also independent, the appropriate test is a proportion test on two independent samples, where C is elected in 45 cases out of 92 in plurality elections, and in 53 cases out of 92 in runoff elections. The test statistics is 1.18, with a two-tailed p-value of 0.24. The difference is not significant. Now, because of some learning and coordination effects going on within series of elections (see section 3.), observations within series are likely to be correlated. In that case, we rather take as the observational unit the average probability for the C candidate to be elected within a series of elections. The two-tailed Student's t-test p-value is 0.46: again we cannot reject the hypothesis that the means are the same in the two samples. payoffs are used to induce preferences over the set of candidates. The nature of those monetaryinduced preferences may be different from voters' true political preferences, and people might be more tactical in our experimental setting than in real world elections. Furthermore, in our experiment, elections are repeated by series of fours, allowing subjects some time to adapt and coordinate. Lastly, we use students as subjects, who are likely to have stronger cognitive skills than non-student subjects, and therefore may engage in more strategic thinking. We therefore believe that, compared to real elections, our experimental results probably provide an upper bound for the size of the psychological effect.
